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Introducing, managing, and sustaining change in public service 
organizations is challenging for policy makers to implement and for 
scholars to theorize. In 2010, the U.K. Government introduced policy 
changes to help bring down the national deficit. The executive’s planned 
reforms aimed to deliver a so-called battle-winning military force, a 
smaller and more professional Ministry of Defence, and an affordable 
overall defence organization. The article borrows from theories of 
management and public policy to help enlighten our understanding of 
change under New Public Management and governance approaches. 
The article’s central claim is that the U.K. Government sought to correct 
cost-efficiency processes in public service organizations trying to reshape 
organizational and managerial structures dependent on many internal 
and external pressures. The article examines the executive’s purpose in 
developing a need for change and the ways to implement it. I question 
whether the U.K. Government’s prescriptive and hierarchical approach 
to organizational change in public administration is sustainable in the 
long term.
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Introducción del cambio en las organizaciones de servicio público bajo 
austeridad: el caso complejo de la gobernanza de la defensa en el Reino Unido
Introducir, gestionar y mantener el cambio en las organizaciones de 
servicio público es un desafío para los encargados de formular políticas 
y para que los académicos teoricen. En 2010, el gobierno del Reino 
Unido introdujo cambios en las políticas para ayudar a reducir el déficit 
nacional. Las reformas planificadas del ejecutivo tenían como objetivo 
entregar una fuerza militar llamada ganadora de batalla; un ministerio de 
defensa más pequeño y profesional; y una organización de defensa general 
asequible. El artículo toma prestado de las teorías de gestión y políticas 
públicas para ayudar a aclarar nuestra comprensión del cambio bajo la 
Nueva Gestión Pública y los enfoques de gobernanza. La afirmación 
central del artículo es que el gobierno del Reino Unido buscó corregir los 
procesos de costo / eficiencia en las organizaciones de servicio público 
que intentaban remodelar las estructuras organizativas y gerenciales que 
dependen de muchas presiones internas y externas. El artículo examina 
el propósito del ejecutivo para desarrollar una necesidad de cambio y 
las formas de implementarlo. Me pregunto si el enfoque prescriptivo y 
jerárquico del gobierno del Reino Unido para el cambio organizacional 
en la administración pública es sostenible a largo plazo.
Palabras Clave: Reino Unido, Nueva administración pública, Gobernanza, 
Cambio planificado y emergente, Gobierno de coalición, Administración 
Pública, Elaboración de políticas, Sector de defensa, Reformas, Política 
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Governments balancing their budgets in a period of fiscal austerity are 
faced with the problems of managing delivery demands while trying to cut 
back the rising burden of expensive public services (Hunt 2011; McTaggart 
and O’Flynn 2015; Solar and Smith 2020a, 2020b). During the first half  of 
the 2010s, for example, Western industrialized nations sought to scale down 
the size of defence saving on personnel, civilian workforce, equipment, and 
capabilities, while proposing new ways of managing the sector during austerity 
(see Dorman, Uttley, and Wilkinson 2016; The Economist 2017; Taylor 2012). 
In Australia, the central government launched Project Suakin after years of 
inertia, to create a more flexible and adaptable defence, seeking “maximum 
efficiency” in the workforce (Latham and Sawyer 2014). In the United States, 
Barack Obama froze military procurement spending across fiscal budgets and 
assigned a series of crosscutting reforms. In Canada, the government introduced 
a reduction of around 10 percent in the defence budget and stripped the military 
of their role in acquisition programs (Leuprecht and Sokolsky 2015). Worldwide, 
radical restructuration was greeted with skepticism by observers who suggested 
more modest cuts and gradual changes to the organizational management of 
defence. Post-Cold War budget reductions did not affect, however, all advanced 
economies equally—with some cases increasing their overall defence expenditure 
as a percentage of their GDP, for example, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway 
(Chalmers 2010; Layton 2015; O’Hanlon 2013).
In the United Kingdom, the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition 
government (2010-15) introduced a series of austerity-driven policies to reverse 
the fiscal deficit. These cuts affected a vast range of public service organizations 
in the nonprotected areas of government spending, including national security. 
It should be said, however, that cuts to the defence sector were less than to 
other nonring-fenced departments. Prime Minister David Cameron launched 
the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) in 2010, arguing for three 
main pillars to support an austere defence: a smaller “battle-winning” military; 
a leaner Ministry of Defence (MoD); and, overall, more affordable defence 
governance (HM Government 2010). In light of such fiscal restraint, the defence 
sector was pushed to recalibrate and downsize operational conditions in the war 
on Afghanistan, their NATO commitments, and the “special relationship” with 
the United States (Chalmers 2010; Conley 2010; Foreman 2014; Gannon 2014). 
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The decline in the defence budget since then has been around 8 percent. As a 
result, core defence institutions (MoD, Army, Navy, and Air Force) made almost 
30,000 armed forces posts redundant. They withdrew major military equipment 
such as jet fighters, tanks, artillery holdings, frigates, and an aircraft carrier. The 
private defence industry lost contracts on some significant investments in patrol 
and attack aircraft. Cameron’s Government and the succeeding led by Theresa 
May (2016-19) reduced at least 25 percent of the MoD’s running costs.
Scholars working in the affairs of strategic and foreign policy have since 
emphasized the challenges inherited by the SDSR and its updated version 
launched in 2015 (Dorman 2010; Dorman, Uttley, and Wilkinson 2016; 
Hammerstad and Boas 2015; Ritchie 2011; Taylor 2012). yet, less attention has 
been put on other equally relevant aspects of modern governance, especially after 
retrospectively viewing the government’s prescriptive changes for the defence 
sector. As Archuleta (2016, 51) argued, “while international relations purists 
and policy studies sceptics may be content with this status quo, a public policy 
approach to defence and national security questions is long overdue in the field.”
The article aimed to fill that gap and explore the United Kingdom’s top-down 
model for change based on the SDSR. In 2010, the National Security Strategy 
(NSS) and the SDSR were separate policy documents, mostly under the wing of 
the MoD; however—and because of the austerity program—the Treasury had 
an unprecedented involvement in the SDSR. It was only in 2015 that the NSS 
and the SDSR were brought together by the Cabinet Office and supervised by 
the National Security Council (NSC). The article argues that change strategies 
from the executive’s point of view tend to be seen as formal, rational, and 
preplanned processes with a focus on implementing and responding to change 
through a deliberate strategy. This perspective, though, tends to cut out of the 
picture the messy, less rational, and emergent processes by which change is 
created and given form. The article’s central claim argues that the government’s 
austerity reforms sought to correct cost-efficiency processes in a way similar to 
how change is enforced upon private organizations. Under financial constraints, 
the latter are said to be more flexible to accommodate organizational change 
in areas of management, processes, and staffing (Andersen 2010; Hodge 2016). 
Public service organizations, however, are rigid structures with organizational 
and managerial patterns dependent on many internal and external pressures, 
including corporate culture, social obligations, legislatures, transparency 
measures, regulation, overseeing bodies, and public accountability (Burnes 
2009; Thompson 2000).
To address change, the article identifies a set of political, economic, social, 
technological, legal, and environmental drivers that have conditioned change in 
the defence sector, enlightening the public-private distinction. Changes in the 
armed forces left the MoD and the armed services demoralized and unsure of the 
way that the pillars of the SDSR were to be executed (see Kirkup 2010). This grim 
environment begs the question as to whether the government’s proposed changes 
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were feasible, and also if they were adequately envisioned. As was later evidenced, 
in 2015, the executive recoiled and conditioned some of its proposals to critical 
junctures (such as the General Election, and then Brexit), concealing its capacity 
to manage and lead change in a complex strategic policy-making scenario.
In the article, change is understood as being nonlinear and not an isolated 
event. Instead, change is open-ended, cumulative, and unpredictable—with 
a steady learning from success and failure from small actions with large 
consequences (see Burnes 2009, 362). Change is context based and situational. 
The article first reviews change in the public sector and some elements of the 
New Public Management (NPM) approach. Later, it delivers an analysis of some 
drivers of change relevant to the SDSR. I then present a discussion based on 
the theories introduced from the management literature, including the planned 
and emergent approaches for understanding change in public organizations 
(Burnes 2004a, 2004b; Kickert 2010; Sminia and Van Nistelrooij 2006). The 
planned approach views change as the result of a process that is hierarchical, 
authoritative, and set through the planning and identifying goals. Meanwhile, 
the emergent approach assumes change as being external to the control of 
organizations, leading to accommodation processes that are participative and 
encourage innovation (Osborne and Brown 2005). To conclude, the article 
debates how government’s disruptive changes to defence policy making have 
lived up to the events.
Defence Governance and Post-New Public Management
The advanced democracies have expedited austerity processes that include 
the cutting of workforces and policy programs (Fernández and Wise 2010; 
Meijer 2014; Van der Voet and Vermeeren 2017). The ongoing wave of budget 
strictness and public sector reform usually rings back to NPM approaches to 
modern governance that, since the 1980s, have influenced public policy and 
change in many different ways. In Great Britain, for instance, NPM imprinted a 
managerial approach on defence that sought for performance measure indicators 
and “customer” satisfaction for public benefit (Carr 2001; Lonsdale 2009). 
From the 1970s, the Conservative Party and the Thatcher Government put faith 
in “reducing the role of the state in the delivery of public services and increasing 
the marketization of all sectors of society” (Smith 2015, 64). A second wave 
of this marketization of the public services hit governments’ defence expenses 
to claim more value for money, making the privatization of certain services 
more visible (i.e., private contractors and alliances with technology and human 
resources companies). From the late 1990s, the defence sector sought for greater 
decentralization and lesser bureaucratization, drifting away from traditional 
public administration systems that had ruled over the sector during the Cold 
War (Bishop 1995; Sweetman 1990). Decentralization, nevertheless, did not 
occur until the adoption of various ministerial reforms was pushed forward by 
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the Conservative-Liberal coalition. Defence’s corporate interests grew in size, 
reaching a peak during the New Labour era under Prime Ministers Tony Blair 
and Gordon Brown (Institute for Fiscal Studies 2015). Political consensus at 
the turn of the century allowed for the model to carry on, with the hope of 
maintaining Britain’s foreign and defence capabilities (Richards and Smith 
2002). Civilians at the MoD did gain more managerial control, but meanwhile, 
the armed forces budget kept rising (De Castella 2015; Martin 2009).
The coalition came to power with the idea that British Government had 
entered a process of transformation into a more “balanced and stronger” 
economy, with other stakeholders, such as industry, playing a contributing role 
regarding public policy objectives (Ministry of Defence 2010f). The authorities 
were keen to say that, “while we cannot provide certainty in defence in an 
unstable world, we can provide better management of unpredictability to enable 
better management and investment planning for both the military and industry” 
(Ministry of Defence 2010f). The jump to a more recent post-NPM scenario 
evidenced at the turn of the century, and branded by some authors as new 
public governance, has in a sense pushed governments into more transparent 
and accountable forms of governing (Hyndman and Liguori 2016).
Theoretically, governing military and security bodies, and thus leading and 
managing change, was rooted in the notion that defence governance happens 
through negotiation, participation, and consensus among stakeholders in how 
to deliver the executive’s polity agenda. The trouble is that in the defence sector, 
hierarchies can hinder change, due to, among other factors, national security 
measures being imposed over many of the tasks given to the overly bureaucratic 
defence organizations (Phillips 2012; Taylor 2012). Against this background, 
governments have opened a window for change and management that is both 
unpredictable and undefined.
NPM, as the new orthodoxy of public service, was supported domestically 
by governments and by global organizations that transfer policy from country 
to country. One of the pillars to drive policy change and manage it has survived 
ongoing economic uncertainty in light of one core premise: there is an ideological 
commitment to economic competition as a model that achieves efficiency in free 
markets. However, the article argues that change is different for each public sector 
organization despite our understanding of universal principles of governance 
under NPM (see Hood and Dixon 2016; Hyndman and Lapsley 2016). The 
ongoing waves of public service reform based on managerial approaches, the 
marketization of public services, and the creation of policy networks responsive 
to community has led NPM to a change from public administration to public 
management. Under the latter, public service organizations are understood to 
be proactive and capable of anticipating strategic calculation about change and 
their relationship with their stakeholders (Solar and Smith 2020a, 2020b).
In the policy management literature, the planned and emergent approaches to 
change emphasize the uncertainty brought about by the incoming waves of public 
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governance. The planned approach tries to avoid uncertainty by suggesting that 
authorities identify what is required to enforce change in public organizations; 
meanwhile, a vision taken from the emergent stream tries to organize change 
reacting to uncertainty; this happens by accommodating and preparing public 
service organizations for an environment of constant adaptation. For example, 
in Kurt Lewin’s (1997) exploration of the planned approach, public institutions 
are identified as reticent to change because they are forces that sustain the status 
quo. Various competing interests prevent change because it is normal for these 
intra and extra institutional forces to be of similar strength, dealing in great 
detail with stable governance conditions. Change will happen, nevertheless, as 
one of these forces start to shift, creating new power balances within the field. In 
2010, for example—and only five months after assuming office—the government 
lined up its diagnostic of the “present” with that of a “desired future state” for 
the defence. This approach is closer to the planned understanding of leading 
and managing change. Although authors in the field have found no consensus, 
both the planned and the emergent perspectives form part of a spectrum 
between deterministic ways of understanding change, and those that emphasize 
voluntarists notions of change. Determinists argue that the environment is an 
unpredictable force of change and can form the background within which a 
single public service organization, or a set, may operate. Voluntarists are less 
contextually dependent and put more explanatory power on the decision making 
of societal members, in particular those with leading skills (Hughes 2010). This 
managerial approach is said to be driven by specific triggers of change.
The article uses process tracing to give evidence of the political and economic 
governance of defence and to evaluate possible explanatory claims examining, 
in this case, actions taken by policy makers. Process tracing allows analyzing 
trajectories of change describing episodes, sequences, and building blocks often 
understood as a temporal concatenation of events or phenomena (Collier 2011). 
Through this approach, the article seeks to untangle complex processes into 
crucial junctures of change in defence polity. Reconstructing the sequence of 
events and how the actors involved in the governance of defence behaved will 
help shed light on observable mechanism of change (González-Ocantos and 
LaPorte 2019). Any exercise on process tracing requires disintegration and, thus, 
recognizing and interpreting certain events from a larger scale of interconnected 
events (Tilly 2001). The article presents a sample of such events rather than 
a big chunk of history. It collects original data from different sources (policy 
papers, speeches, press articles, official reports, among other forms of primary 
data) to document various aspects of the theoretical claim and to fill possible 
evidentiary gaps and missingness. The primary data are used to explain events 
as described by an eyewitness to the policy event or someone who experienced 
the event (Persaud and Salkind 2012). In this case, primary data sources and 
primary sources will prove information that is closest to the study of governance 
and change. The contextual knowledge that follows is a calibrated effort to shed 
light on credible empirical narratives of change.
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When examining the sequence of  these drivers of  organizational change 
one should assume that there is no consensus on why organizations change; 
however, the key is on acknowledging competing explanations of  determinist 
(environment) versus voluntarist (societal) nature. In such a sense, triggers 
of  change can be identified as of  a political (i.e., elections, NPM, state 
reform, regionalization), economic (i.e., global economy, recession, austerity, 
marketization, trade), social (i.e., aging, social inclusion, minorities), 
technological (i.e., e-government, IT innovation), legal (i.e., constitution, 
legislation), and environmental nature (i.e., natural disasters, global warming). 
As well, they respond to national, regional, and local scales of  governance 
(Osborne and Brown 2005). The specific analysis of  these drivers of  change 
(or PESTLE) will be explored next.
Political
Maybe one of the essential factors for the government’s planned change for 
the defence lay in the desire to move away from the previous Labour leadership 
of the military. The main points, argued by David Cameron’s Government, for 
rapidly pushing forward the SDSR can be identified as follows:
• The mismanagement of the defence was blamed on the previous Labour 
Government.
• Even if  defence spending kept pace with inflation, the government faced a deficit 
of many billions of pounds over the life of parliament and more over the next 
decade.
• It was assumed that the cost of successive generations of equipment would 
continue to rise at above the rate of inflation.
• Contractual and structural commitments on personnel and equipment meant that 
the budget was very heavily committed for each of the next four years, severely 
limiting the government’s ability to maneuver.
• Labour’s solution to all this was to delay projects, increasing long-term costs, and 
to continue to rely on an Strategic Defence Review (SDR) long past its sell-by 
date.
• The problem was structural, so the response also had to be structural to put 
defence on a stable footing. The MoD itself  had to face reform.
• The government intended to reorganize the whole organization around three 
pillars: first, strategy and policy; second, armed forces; and third, procurement 
and estates.
• The authorities wanted to create a more efficient and leaner center where everyone 
knew what they were responsible for and to whom they were accountable.
• Major reform of our procurement practices was to be accompanied by a number 
of industrial consultations outlined to Parliament.
• While the SDSR was resource informed, it was said to be policy led (adapted from 
Ministry of Defence 2010b).
On that basis, the executive’s planned program established the following 
guidelines as the three core principles of the SDSR:
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• Relevance: Defence posture and capabilities should be relevant to the world we 
live in, dispensing with much of the Cold War legacy.
• Realism: We cannot insure against every imaginable risk so we should decide 
which risks we are willing to take.
• Responsibility: the nation has a duty to support our service personnel. We are 
determined to insure they have what they need to do what we ask of  them, and 
that they and their families are looked after properly (Ministry of  Defence 
2010a).
The changes for the defence were to be only considered successful if  
a coherent new commitment to austerity politics was enforced across the 
executive branch, with a focus on nonprotected budget areas. Government 
sought a collective desire to align strategy and capabilities. However, this effort 
was continually thwarted. Early on, Sir David Richards, Chief  of  Defence 
Staff  (a position nominated by the MoD and approved by the prime minister), 
praised the SDSR. In November 2010, Richards noted that the SDSR had 
come to ensure “transformation” and provide the military with direction. He 
even quoted Winston Churchill, saying “to improve is to change; to be perfect 
is to change often” (Richards 2010).
However, a document prepared by military officers and senior MoD officials, 
and entitled “SDSR Lesson Identified,” described the proposed reforms as being 
carried out too quickly and without proper advice. They blamed the direction 
taken by the recently created NSC in enforcing defence cuts. The government 
then promptly undermined the document, criticizing its opportunism and lack 
of authority. However, in a letter revealed by the media in late 2010, the Secretary 
of Defence, Liam Fox, had warned David Cameron of the consequences of 
“draconian” defence cuts (Kirkup 2010). With the SDSR already in the making 
and the fear of miscalculating cuts to defence ever-present, the government went 
ahead to enforce its full agenda of change.
Economical
When they were the opposition, the Conservative Party estimated the defence 
budget deficit at £39 billion. However, once in government, and considering the 
cost that the SDSR brought, the sum peaked to £55 billion. The government had 
not only to clear that debt but also reduce the budget. The SDSR received cross-
sector political revision through a spending evaluation; this was part of a more 
holistic discussion where it was agreed to minimize governmental debt from 11 
to 1.1 percent of the GDP. The coalition argued that the Cabinet Office, the 
NSC, and the Home Office had worked together to make the SDSR the “most 
thorough” review of defence since a previous SDR launched by New Labour in 
1998. Through the creation of the NSC, the coalition shifted responsibility from 
the MoD to the Cabinet Office. The NSC’s primary purpose is to serve as “the 
main forum for collective discussion of the government’s objectives for national 
security and about how best to deliver them in the current financial climate” 
10 | POLITICS & POLICy / Month 2020
(HM Government 2018). Through the NSC, the prime minister and the Cabinet 
Office ensure that ministers “consider national security in the round and in a 
strategic way” and implement matters of the SDSR and the NSS, minding for 
issues funded by cross-government expenditure (HM Government 2018).
Britain’s defence sector is guided by three documents: the Defence Review 
(overseeing public expenditure), the NSS (outlining the MoD’s approach to 
the risk of attack), and the SDSR. The coalition proposed the Defence Review 
as a “financial template” for which to consider budgets for their services. The 
review then established a series of categories upon which a methodology was 
coined, including items on cost-efficiency and their financial, operational, and 
capability implications. In a later interview, Fox put it this way:
[There were] a huge number of projects that we looked at against that—a 
lot of options inside each one, hundreds and hundreds of them. It took us 
a long time, but the reason that we did it that way, was I wanted to create 
a paper trail for future Defence Reviews so that people could see why we 
took decisions and what information we were looking at when we took that 
decision. Whether or not that is carried through to this Defence Review, 
not my issue or call. But I imagine the Defence Select Committee will be 
very interested in whether the methodology was continued. (Institute for 
Government 2015)
Once the economic assessment was on its way, Fox described it “the absolute 
mother of horrors of a spending review” as each service was asked what could 
be done with the institutions to lose 10 or 20 percent of their budgets (BBC 
2010). Subsequent analyses categorized the prospect of the service cuts as 
a small “vigilant” capability, a mid-sized “adaptable” military, or a mostly 
unchanged “committed” force (The Economist 2010). Only in mid-2012, did 
a new defence chief, Phillip Hammond, announce that only through “tough,” 
“necessary,” and “radical” reform, had the black hole in the defence budget been 
eliminated. Balancing the program thus meant moving ahead with the planned 
changes, taking special consideration in limiting the number and roles of MoD 
ministers, better management of financial IT services, and more responsibility 
for the budgets of the armed services (Levene 2011).
Social
Various waves of redundancy schemes affected personnel in combat 
operations as well as those in administrative roles. Some social conditions 
allowed the redundancies to take place, backed by the government’s belief  that 
service leavers had a solid chance of finding jobs as civilians. The coalition-
planned strategy suggested that around 85 percent of those made redundant were 
employed within six months of leaving defence institutions (HM Government 
2013). The government then moved on to enforce redundancies, minimizing 
the force by decreasing the number of recruits and not replacing those who 
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left. The MoD also proposed a pension scheme that rewarded those leaving the 
armed forces at 40 if  they had been enrolled for a fixed number of years. Other 
social groups, such as civilian personnel, saw a drastic reduction in numbers. By 
April 1, 2010, MoD data accounted for 85,850 of the civilian population. The 
expected reduction established in the SDSR was met after a decrease of 28,990 
civilians by October 2015 (or 33.8 percent). Further cuts were made, and a 
planned reduction of another 30 percent was predicted by 2020. As of October 
2017, MoD civilian personnel totaled 57,050.
Technological
Despite the financial urgency, more money was allocated in the military 
workforce and equipment across the services. This became visible in 2013 when 
the SDSR was said to be in positive numbers. As explained by the government, 
the renegotiation of contracts with industry and the reform of procurement 
would allow for the purchasing of “state-of-the-art equipment worth £160 
billion” over a decade (Hammond 2013). The move took many observers by 
surprise as the government was now backing the purchase of major military 
programs including new aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, and armored 
vehicles. The MoD quickly announced the military strategy entitled “Future 
Force 2020” and the government moved forward with the SDSR on the basis 
that new technological elements were needed in the areas of intelligence, 
surveillance, cyber warfare, and unmanned technologies, not as Cameron (2014) 
mentioned, for “tanks in the European mainland.” The prime minister argued 
that the previous economic restraint showed “that our prudence is paying off. 
The fact is we are only in a position to make these investments because we have 
been resolute in tackling the deficit, a key part of our long-term economic plan” 
(Cameron 2014).
Legal
The wide-ranging defence reform program of the SDSR was driven by a 
legal scenario that allowed the government to plan and enforce change around 
two main areas. For example, through the Defence Reform Act, which achieved 
Royal Assent in 2014, the government decided to boost legislation to improve 
the procurement of defence equipment and strengthen the reserve forces. The 
MoD’s “Transforming Defence” program was meant to deliver ways for a single 
source procurement to make significant savings for the department, while also 
trying to ensure a more transparent system (Hambleton, Holder, and Kirkpatrick 
2013). The government extended its powers to call out for reservists to join 
regular forces when needed. A further white paper entitled “Future Reserves 
2020: Delivering the Nation’s Security Together,” reemphasized the reservists’ 
contribution to defence and national security (Ministry of Defence 2012); this 
followed the 2015 SDSR and the Future Force 2020, which had by then turned 
into “strategy-oriented” schemes (Edmunds et al. 2016).
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In conclusion, the drivers for the 2010-15 changes to the defence sector 
cannot be reduced to single elements. Instead, they work best when seen as the 
combination of multifactored causations and nonhierarchical developments 
complementing each other. The next section returns to a few key ideas from the 
management and public policy literature to discuss how these changes affected 
the government’s planned strategy.
A “Break of Mindset”
Planned change strategies were popular in the 1980s due to the work 
of management consultants who advocated for a one-size-fits-all type of 
approaches to change in private institutions. Emergent change, on the other 
side, turned popular as more dynamic environments for public and private 
organizations emerged, and the focus became on the struggles within and in 
their environment. Approaching change was then understood as a consensus-
building exercise in which reform was a continuous, unpredictable, and highly 
political phenomenon. Managers and leaders became highly essential, this time 
through a multidimensional and horizontal performance point of view against 
the previously popular top-down models. In this section, the article discusses 
how individuals can take the responsibility of being the change agent, whether 
as neutral or interested operators.
When the SDSR was launched in October 2010, it broke with a tradition 
of previous reviews that focused only on the security of the state. One of the 
critical agents, Secretary Liam Fox (2010), argued that the SDSR had been 
designed to “make a clean break from the military and political mindset of 
Cold War politics.” The coalition government included new policy areas in the 
SDSR, namely counter-terrorism, international aid and diplomacy, border and 
cyber security, and homeland defence. The extent of the restructuring proved 
the coalition’s ambitious plan to manage change. As Walker and Mills (2018, 
4) put it, “to bring all the different strands of work together in a coherent, 
coordinated and effective manner, both the NSS and the SDSR acknowledged 
the need for strong leadership and guidance at the center of government” (see 
also Fitz-Gerald 2008).
Nevertheless, management and ownership within the defence reform 
became socially contested, more so, as the coalition set in motion its austerity 
program. The public, on the one side, recognized the importance of  the cuts 
(which consequently empowered the executive); however, they also cared 
about cuts harming their living conditions and security (Clarke et al. 2013). 
For two other critical agents, David Cameron, and the Chancellor of  the 
Exchequer, George Osborne, the need to correct the books of  public spending 
across was a priority for the government (HM Treasury 2010). Fox (2010) put 
it this way:
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After 12 years without a defence review, over a period where our armed 
forces have been at times overstretched, with some current equipment 
overused and out of date, with legacy programs from the Cold War 
that are of less relevance today, and in a terrible economic and financial 
circumstances, we cannot afford to delay. But I want to be as open as I can 
about this backdrop because, to be frank, change is not an option, it is a 
necessity.
For more specialized players (i.e., high-level active military, retired personnel, 
journalists, practitioners, and academics), the coalition government faced limited 
policy choices as the radical processes of prescriptive and recipe-driven changes 
were enforced. Gearson and Gow (2010) believe that the SDSR was a blank 
canvas on which the executive could reconfigure relationships within government, 
across departments, and with Parliament (see also Phillips 2012; Savill 2011). 
It, thus, became essential for cross-sector accountability and responsibility to 
lead the changes proposed. In that vein, the SDSR “was portrayed as a unique 
opportunity to rebalance the defence priorities, commitments, and spending” 
(Walker and Mills 2018, 28).
Imposing Change: Planned or Processual?
In an era of post-NPM governance, change and management in public 
organizations is determined by various factors affecting different levels of 
governance, global, national, institutional, managerial, and technical (Lynn, 
Heinrich, and Hill 2001). What is common across scales, to a certain point, 
is that defence institutions appear to converge toward change reforms steered 
from the most senior authorities. The executive, for example, stated that the 
SDSR was a point of departure, not the end of the line. Liam Fox added, “The 
reality is that implementation of what we have set out will be no easy ride, there 
remain hard decisions to take, and there is no new money. So, if  the penny has 
yet to drop, let it drop now” (Ministry of Defence 2010e).
The MoD set out its business plan with its top priorities including how to 
implement the SDSR; restructuring the armed forces and their capabilities; 
rebuilding the armed forces Covenant and developing the New Employment 
Model (see Ministry of Defence 2015); as well as, delivering the Defence Reform 
Unit’s review. For this, the MoD was to report progress every month against the 
so-called Structural Reform Plan. The Secretary of State for Defence and the 
Permanent Secretary were made accountable every quarter by the Chief Secretary 
to the Treasury and the Minister for the Cabinet Office for delivery against the 
plan; meanwhile, the Director General of Finance was to be subject to a monthly 
review meeting with the Cabinet Office and Treasury. When the departmental 
business plan was published, Cabinet Minister Oliver Letwin noted:
Taken together, these plans will change the nature of government. They 
represent a power shift, taking power away from Whitehall and putting it 
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into the hands of people and communities; and a horizon shift, turning 
government’s attention toward the long-term decisions that will equip 
Britain for sustainable social success and sustainable economic growth. 
(Ministry of Defence 2010d)
Can we take Letwin’s position as an aspiration to change? Change agents 
provide coordination, direction, and sustainability, through devolving, 
subordinating, and acting themselves over change (Burnes 2009; Hughes 2010). 
However, they also “find themselves in complex and often changing networks of 
people, institutions, opportunities, and problems” (Carnall 2007, 154). Together 
with the SDSR came the need to reform the MoD, a strategy for which a Defence 
Reform Unit was set up, in charge of both structural changes (in terms of policy 
and strategy, the armed forces, and procurement and estates), and cultural changes 
(to bring forward a decentralized, devolving, and more accountable organization). 
Fox described the reform unit as “a heavy-hitting steering group of internal and 
external experts [who] will guide the hard thinking and challenge preconceptions” 
(Ministry of Defence 2010c). Lord Levene chaired the reform unit together with 
a committee of members from outside the MoD and supported by a civil service 
implementation team. The reform unit was also meant to work with the chief of 
defence staff and service chiefs “to find ways of giving greater devolution for the 
running of the services themselves” (Ministry of Defence 2010c). The government 
also wanted to reconsider the current senior rank structure across the services to 
match SDSR outcomes. Fox stated that “we cannot demand efficiency from the 
lower ranks while exempting those at the top” (Ministry of Defence 2010c).
Despite the coalition’s desire to replace the old top-down system of targets 
and central micromanagement style, changes did not result as desired by the 
executive. Some observers saw early on that many of the SDSR aspects had been 
brought forward through limited negotiation or consultation with the parties 
involved—most notably, armed forces personnel. Most commentators agreed 
that the SDSR was too top-down and target-objective driven (see Dover and 
Phythian 2012).
In theory, the planned approach to change is said to be effective at depicting 
real-world processes of reform that are linear and respond to systematic 
behaviors. The effects on decision making and policy making brought about 
by the SDSR clearly showed that real-world change is complex, dynamic, and 
does not necessarily respond to a linear relationship between triggers of change 
and change outcomes. On the contrary, a processual understanding of change 
in both public and private organizations, linked to the emergent approach, 
would argue that change occurs at different levels where linear events are not 
clearly constructed (Kickert 2010; Pettigrew 1997). Moreover, if  within the 
United Kingdom the whole purpose of NPM reform was to create a minimalist 
state (see Bevir, Rhodes, and Weller 2003), changes in the core structures 
would be easy as public institutions could be constricted for somewhat limited 
bureaucracies. For the defence sector, however, the move went the other way as 
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it grew in complexity, mushrooming into various administrative structures and 
organizational subcultures.
For some scholars, the orthodoxy of NPM has survived the test of time 
mostly because of its adaptability to economic uncertainty and greater ideological 
commitment to the efficiency of the free market (Osborne and Brown 2005). 
What is of concern here is how the defence sector approached change in light of 
the overlapping elements from NPM and the new public governance evidenced 
across the defence sector, for example, the overall performance measurement 
and cost-affordability notions for decision and policy making within the services. 
Theoretically, the post-NPM scenario meant that public services became more 
proactive and capable in the way they anticipated change. However, in the case 
of the defence sector, we see that a large, hierarchical, siloed, and fragmented 
set of public organizations do not necessarily react well to change proposed 
from the center when this ignores the politics of interrelated institutions and 
incremental change situations. In a sense, the principles of NPM have obscured 
the meaning of change within specific public policy sectors in favor of a 
universal understanding of public sector reform. Richardson (2018) suggested 
that our understanding of the British policy process is going back to a policy 
style in which so-called governance emphasis fades away to a more traditional 
Westminster model of governing (i.e., with less bargaining and consensus 
among interested groups). Isolating change can help us identify how leading 
change from the center has come to affect defence governance in this and other 
substantial ways.
Understanding Change
To reinforce the article’s argument, this section brings forward explanations 
of why change closely relates to the context in which public service organizations 
operate. Contextual analysis is dependent on factors that are worth discussing 
because of timing and their multifactual nature (i.e., political, societal, and 
economic). The context of change is both internal and external and affected by 
past, present, and future. Critical perspectives would argue that the environment 
does not force change upon actors—but rather, actors work within the context 
and act to shape this context. Observers of institutional theories, for example, 
would argue that policy makers can copy and adapt change learned from other 
public organizations (see Hughes 2010, 65). Proponents of planned change 
would assume that change that is the result of a systematic process of scanning 
the environment and determining how an organization should change. Emergent 
change, however, is the results of actions thrust upon an organization that are 
outside of its control (Osborne and Brown 2005).
In one of the seminal NPM debates, Christopher Hood argued that public 
services tend to adapt to the “corporatization” of the public sector through 
greater emphasis on management methods that were measurable in performance 
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of success, just as corporations do (Hood 1991, 1995). years later, Burnes 
(2009, 404-5) confirmed the tendency, asserting that “successive governments 
in the United Kingdom and elsewhere have put considerable pressure on their 
respective public sectors to deliver more cost-effective and more customer-
responsive services.” In one way, the coalition’s cost-benefit approach to set 
change translated in the SDSR’s corporatization. The move was somehow 
rationalized by the government even before the Conservatives assumed office. 
While lecturing at a think tank in London in February 2010, Liam Fox said, 
“Make no mistake; we need a step change, not tinkering” (RUSI 2010). Because 
change in defence was mostly dependent on the coalition’s preconceived 
assumption of how the sector should look over the next few years, it is initially 
assumed that the emergent approach to change cannot explain much of the 
SDSR outcomes or the proposed changes.
On the contrary, it can be said that the government was working within a 
unique context (one marked by austerity) and acted to shape polities according 
to its reforming choices. The planned approach works well in hierarchic sectors 
where no significant cultural change is required for risk-averse public service 
organizations. Change imposed from the center tends to be prescriptive, meaning 
that change strategies are seen as formal, rational, and preplanned processes. In 
this view, the 2010 SDSR embodied the government’s desire to implement a 
defence reform through a deliberate strategy. Thus, the SDSR contained little 
space for messy, less rational, or “emergent” processes of change. Although, and 
as the changes went on, the overall defence transformation responded to other 
unpredicted events that caused some governmental U-turns (Chalmers 2010). 
For example, Cameron was hesitant to maintain defence spending at 2 percent 
of the GDP as identified in the SDSR while also meeting the deficit-reduction 
targets. However, after the 2015 General Election, Cameron finally subscribed 
the budget to NATO’s target level.
What is also debatable here is how throughout the afterlife of  the SDSR, 
the government has adapted to the process of  change. Lewin (1997) established 
that organizations can enter a three-step model of  change where they start by 
unfreezing from inertia, move in the direction of  desired change, and then 
refreeze/stabilize again as they sink into a new status quo. By applying this 
approach to the defence sector, it is reasonable to say that the first two stages 
were met as the defence sector was hit by changes that compelled a process 
of  moving forward toward a new horizon. yet, what is less clear is that by 
choosing a planned change strategy, a new equilibrium was found. The 2015 
SDSR updated version evidenced a knowable end-stage; however, to the eyes 
of  many commentators, it only gave continuity to the already established areas 
of  main change: personnel reductions, revamping the MoD, and cost-cutting 
waste in the overall defence governance (see Dorman, Uttley, and Wilkinson 
2016).
Theories of change and management emphasize the planned change model 
as a response to processes (methods used for change) and phases of  change 
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(stages that organizations walk to achieve change). Planned change occurs 
as organizations pass through states of exploration, planning, action, and 
integration. Nevertheless, across these stages, public organizations would find 
that a planned approach to change hinders adjustment as there are so many 
pitfalls involved (Bullock and Batten 1985, quoted in Burnes 2009, 343): for 
instance, allowing change at the institutional level to be collaborative or jointly 
designed, democratic and participatory, bottom-down, and fit for environments 
of rapid change (Richards and Smith 2016). The central executive lacked a clear 
incremental strategy that would convey emphasis in clear steps, mainly as the 
SDSR affected not only individual services, but a whole group of public service 
institutions, part of the interrelated and system-wide defence sector (Cleary 
2011). A more analytic perspective for understanding those processual changes 
occurring in defence is needed in this case.
Conclusion
This article provided an exploration of drivers affecting different levels and 
different aspects of change in public service organizations. It argued that the 
contextual factors that shape change in public organizations can be extensive, or, 
very localized. Theoretical approaches from the policy management literature 
can be ultimately analyzed in light of different levels; however, and more 
fundamentally, isolating change can help identify where NPM reform, austerity, 
and governance analytical approaches capture the dynamic capabilities of 
public organizations (see Lo 2018; Piening 2013). The importance of marrying 
these fields of study is that it encourages the overlap of different perceptions 
dealing with change as it puts under the scope processes and decisions that can 
favor or hinder innovation in complex and hierarchic organizations stressed by 
continuous change.
The United Kingdom’s management of defence, as reviewed in the article, 
sets out a rocky road for dealing with change in at least two ways. First, the 
prescriptive and planned approach to change results is hard to pull off  in a 
wholesome way. The SDSR reorientation seen in 2015 shed light on the iterative 
nature of “re-making” a strategic review to eventually reach fruitful ends. Not 
only did the policy world demand a more flexible and multiapproach to change, 
for instance, within the MoD reform, but, from an operations point of view, 
the ability to simultaneously put strain on the armed forces, for example, in 
Libya and Afghanistan (Dover and Phythian 2011), meant a dynamic process of 
political action and learning, that is, in terms of how to make the defence both 
leaner and more efficient at no extra cost.
From the NPM, governance, and organizational change literature, the 
article rescues the idea that public organization face turbulent environments 
that can change in unforeseen and unpredictable ways (see Boyne and Meier 
2009). Prime Minister Theresa May added another layer of  complexity to 
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managing policy change as her austerity measures further stressed defence 
structures and capabilities (Blackburn 2015). May’s foundational layer for 
future military capability came hand in hand with an illusion of  dynamic 
change, as opposed to more structured and hierarchical fiscal austerity plans. 
Tough decisions on managing the sector, as Lord Levene’s annual defence 
form reported, have made the leadership flaws inherited from the NSS 
and SDSR more evident (Dorman, Uttley, and Wilkinson 2016). Also, the 
political origin of  these top-down changes, as well as the need for change 
sustainability, has become quite difficult to identify (Cavanagh 2011). For 
instance, the proposed reforms included in the 2015 revised versions of  the 
NSS and SDSR slimmed-down top-level decision making at the Defence 
Board level. The layers of  senior management have thus seen a considerable 
reduction in size, as the Head Office also became involved, reduced by 25 
percent, likewise, in the armed services, who have seen their powers carved at 
the top. The chief ’s senior structure, however, was reshaped to improve a lack 
of  personal accountability and irresponsible decision making cascading from 
top-down leadership.
Still, other systemic issues remain, most notably, the cultural and political 
factors needed to sustain organizational and processual changes occurring 
inside defence institutions (Levene 2015). Because many outputs from the 
defence management are measured against savings, efficiency, and budget cuts, 
leading and managing change has tested the central government’s ability to 
carry forward the intricate fiscal management of  what Lord Levene referred 
to like the new model of  defence management—one characterized by personal 
accountability, streamlined leadership, the prioritization of  resources, and 
an overall defence policy network managed by both civilian and military 
stakeholders. Under these new conditions, leading and managing change should 
acknowledge the dynamism and decentralization of  policy making, as opposed 
to planned and hierarchical reforms (see Howlett and Ramesh 2014; Peters 
2018). Considering the intertwined factors driving today’s security policy, 
one of  the most active militaries in the world cannot disregard the eventful 
consequences of  change.
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